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The Making of Unipolarity: The Congo as a Case Study 
 
By Justin Tepper 
 
Advisor: Professor Simon Davis 
 
 
  The current international system has been described by some as unipolar. After World 
War II, the United States was able to develop and solidify a liberal international order built upon 
multilateralist principles but founded upon American military and economic supremacy. As a 
result of the orders success, it has become global. The Cold War is generally understood as the 
conflict between the liberal capitalistic American-led order and the Marxist-Leninist Soviet-
centered bloc. To fully understand the making of unipolarity, however, scholars must shift their 
focus to the process of decolonization and the intra-NATO tensions that developed. This paper 
will use the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study. While the USSR posed a threat to 
Congolese Free World alignment during the Congo’s first few months of independence, the 
Congo Crisis ultimately became a clash between the United States and the former colonial 

















During the course of my studies on the Cold War, I became particularly interested not in 
the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States but in America’s relationship with 
decolonization. As a result of nineteenth-century geopolitical struggles, most of the decolonized 
world had colonial ties to members of the Free World. As a result, intra-NATO tensions 
developed in several instances. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States vied 
for Congolese allegiance against Belgium. Once the U.S found a local collaborator in Joseph 
Mobutu, it was able to solidify its position in the African country.  
 While trying to understand America’s actions in response to decolonization, I came to the 
conclusion that my studies were pertinent to explaining unipolarity. The United States was able 
to replace former colonial powers, like Belgium in the Congo; this was how America’s influence 
was able to expand to global proportions. When a former colonial powers rule was no longer 
tenable, the United States was able to fill the vacuum left by the moribund metropole.  
 Through U.S State Department documents, I attempted to explain the United States’ 
struggle in finding a policy pertaining to African decolonization. The problem was that the vital 
economic ties between former colonies and the Free World needed to be maintained. Thus the 
United States was caught in a vice between supporting former colonial powers which were now 
NATO allies and aligning itself with the decolonizing world to the detriment of its allies. In the 
Congo, as in many other decolonized countries, the United States was able to find a local 
collaborator who was willing to be aligned with the Free World. The former colonial powers 
influence, however, would diminish as America’s sphere of influence expanded. This is how 
























































The Cold War is commonly understood as a forty-six (1945-1991) year struggle for 
systemic global supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union. The former 
considered itself the leader of the Free World and espoused a liberal capitalist system. The latter 
ran a centrally planned economy serving Marxist-Leninist revolutionary objectives though 
prioritizing Soviet state security. The important NSC-68, which globalized American anti-
communist ‘containment’ doctrines, interpreted in 1950 that Soviet actions were determined by 
“a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own” and that they were trying to “impose [Soviet] 
absolute authority over the rest of the world.”
1
 These fears were heightened by a successful test 
of a Soviet atomic bomb and the victory of Mao Zedong’s communist army in China. 
Furthermore, the United States’ belief that Stalin wanted to expand the USSR’s influence by 
supporting political activity in the West meant that America could not abandon Europe as it had 
after World War I but had to remain on the continent and help rebuild its war torn economies.  
 What followed the U.S’ decision, in the words of John G. Ikenberry, was “an 
unprecedented burst of global institution building - establishing the United Nations, IMF, World 
Bank, NATO, and an array of other institutions and regimes.”
2
 During World War II, the 
Roosevelt administration envisioned a global system based on free trade that would largely run 
itself; albeit, with limited support from multilateral institutions. By the Truman administration, 
the vision of a one-world system was giving way to one where ideological and geopolitical 
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clashes divided the globe.
3
 Though not the original plan, “the United States took command of 
organizing and running the system” because of the inabilities of America’s post-war allies 
coupled with America’s preponderance of resources and faced by evidently existential Soviet 
challenges, with increasing vigor in the global periphery.
4
  
 Early confrontations had of course centered on Europe, where the USSR imposed its 
system in the east. After the U.S announcement of the Marshall Plan the Allied Council of 
Foreign Ministers convened to try and clarify the terms of an agreement. Vyacheslav Molotov, 
the USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended with eighty-nine economic advisors.
5
 After a 
few days of negotiations, he proposed each country devise its own recovery program. The British 
and French rejected these measures and would continue to participate in America’s plan. 
Molotov angrily walked out and declared that if the proposals were carried out it would divide 
“Europe into two groups of states.” Czechoslovakia and Poland were invited to the Paris 
conference but refused on the grounds that it might be perceived as an action against the Soviet 
Union. Within a week of Molotov’s return to Moscow, the USSR announced its own blueprint 
for recovery – the Molotov Plan.  
The reason why the Soviets were against the Marshall Plan was that its terms treated “all 
the recipient states as part of an economic bloc.”
6
 A central aspect of America’s liberal 
institution building was creating an integrated world market. This would mean Western 
inspectors would have to investigate the strength of the Soviet economy. The Soviets opposed 
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such measures because their weakness was not yet known to the West. The end result was the 
division of the global core into a bipolar capitalist versus communist framework.      
In the military sphere, the Russian counterpart to NATO was the Warsaw Pact, which the 
USSR established in 1955 as a reaction to West Germany’s rearmament and integration into the 
Western military complex. The governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union “established a unified command” 
and “specified the size of the forces each of the signatories pledged to contribute.”
7
 The 
organization’s founding document was modeled on the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, 
which established NATO. The documents were very similar in that both groups of "signatories’ 
professed intent to refrain from the use or threat of force…[and] the almost identical description 
of the consultations they pledged to mutually enter into in case of an enemy attack.”
8
 
While the world was divided along military and economic lines, an arms race ensued. 
Once the Soviet’s tested their first fission bomb in August of 1949, Truman became determined 
to build the first hydrogen bomb and the military one-upmanship began. The American nuclear 
arsenal expanded from under 400 weapons in 1950 to over 20,000 in 1960. Soviet reserves 
increased as well from 5 weapons in 1950 to roughly 1,600 in 1960.
9
 The growth in nuclear 
armaments is just one aspect of the arms race. Conventional weaponry continued to increase in 
technological capabilities and quantity.  
The arms race and the division of the world into bipolar spheres of influence are the 
defined prevailing characteristics of the Cold War. This paper will argue that there is an 
alternative way to understanding the conflict. The 1991 dissolution of the USSR, rather than just 
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the end of a half century long struggle against the Free World, was really the culmination of a 
process that began in the nineteenth century. When a number of countries around the world 
began to subjugate peoples from other lands and create empires. Britain had her substantial 
territorial holdings all over the globe. France had Indochina and French West Africa in addition 
to other miscellaneous relationships. Tsarist Russia, unlike the European powers, established a 
land based empire that stretched from Poland to Manchuria. Japan and Germany were two rising 
powers which made fatal attempts to displace the status quo. In addition to these traditional 
powers, the Netherlands held the Dutch East Indies, Belgium controlled the Congo, and Portugal 
held substantial colonial holdings. These great powers continued to compete against one another 
for influence in order to grow their economies, prestige, and for corresponding strategic security.  
After World War II, the United States envisaged the decolonization of European empires 
as vital to its objectives for a multilateral liberal capitalist world system. While American power 
began to expand in unprecedented ways, the USSR’s influence around the world did not develop 
to the same degree. As Dominic Lieven noted, “The most obvious comparison between the 
Soviet Union and other great empires is with the empire of the tsars, to which in territorial terms 
the USSR was the successor.”
10
 To this extent it could significantly impede and in certain 
respects go on to challenge the universality of American desiderata. The U.S, therefore, tried to 
encircle the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China with bilateral and regional security 
pacts. By the mid-1960s, the U.S had 375 military bases and 3,000 other facilities surrounding 
the Soviet Union and its allies.
11
 While United States capabilities were unprecedentedly global, 
the USSR was still primarily contained in Eastern Europe just as its Tsarist predecessors had 
been. The unevenness of this process of polar co-option, with the U.S geopolitically expanding 
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faster than the USSR, in the name of defending against it, ultimately led to the fall of the latter 
and to the ascension of the unipolar liberal capitalist system we live in today. 
The concept of unipolarity is difficult to define because it has only occurred once in 
history. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish the term from America’s unipolar moment. 
Stephen Walt, however, tentatively captured the nature of the concept when he wrote, “A 
unipolar system is one in which a single state controls a disproportional share of the political 
relevant resources of the system. Unipolarity implies that the single superpower faces no 
ideological rival of equal status or influence.”
12
 Given this definition there are two aspects to 
unipolarity. The first deals with capabilities and resources. Currently, the United States is the 
only country that can deploy its military anywhere on earth and occupy a given territory 
indefinitely– even if an armed opposition is present.
13
 Secondly an ideological system needs to 
be espoused and promulgated. The liberal international order that America built after World War 
II “has been – in contrast to past international orders – relatively easy to join. It is an 
international order that has – in contrast to past international orders – spread wealth and 
economic growth relatively widely.”
14
 As a result, it still persists today.   
What this paper will attempt to add to the scholarship of unipolarity is an explanation, in 
geopolitical terms, of how the present situation was able to develop. It will look at the formation 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and how it was transferred from the Belgian sphere of 
influence to the American orbit. While the Cold War is generally understood as a clash between 
the U.S and USSR, the Congo became the battleground for an intra-NATO dispute. The United 
States, at first, was a pragmatic reluctant power which tried to use the Belgians and the United 
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Nations to maintain stability in the Congo during the tumultuous 1960s. America’s greatest fear 
was Soviet penetration in the Congo, a country rich in copper, cobalt, diamonds, and uranium. 
There were indications this might occur when the country descended into chaos after gaining its 
independence on June 30, 1960. Once there were signs that the USSR was indeed trying to 
establish influence in the African country, the United States was willing to take drastic measures 
to prevent further encroachment; even disposing of the fervent left-leaning prime minister, 
Patrice Lumumba in favor of Joseph Mobutu’s arbitrary authoritarian dictatorship.
15
   
While the Soviet Union threatened to compromise the Congo’s alignment to the Free 
World during the latter’s first few months of independence, the clash between the NATO allies, 
Belgium and the United States, would prove to be a more critical problematic. The former 
metropole wanted to guarantee that its assets would be protected, especially in the most 
profitable provinces of Katanga and South Kasai. Therefore, they backed two secessionist 
movements. The first was in Katanga and led by Moise Tshombe. The second was organized 
around Albert Kalonji in the diamond rich province of South Kasai.
16
 The United States, while 
not wholly opposed to the plan, preferred to keep the Congo intact. In any eventuality, the 
Eisenhower administration was determined to keep U.S troops out of the African country and 
looked towards the United Nations to reinstitute stability. A UN peacekeeping force was sent in 
the summer of 1960 and a Security Council resolution was passed calling for the Belgians to 
withdraw from the Congo.     
The former metropole, however, remained and continued to be a destabilizing factor. The 
USSR, while not playing a large role on the ground in the Congo, was a very vocal opponent on 
the international stage. The Soviets criticized the Belgians, United States, and United Nations by 
                                                          
15
 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 58.  
16
 Ibid, 53.   
7 
 
accusing them of upholding old-style colonialism. As the crisis continued, their charges were 
seconded by the Afro-Asian bloc. By the time John F. Kennedy became president in January 
1961, the United States was prepared to pressure its Western ally in order to bring the conflict to 
a resolution. This intra-Western dispute stemmed from the two country’s statures in the 
international community. Belgium, being a small power had parochial views and wanted to 
retain the economically vital Congo. The United States, on the other hand, had global concerns 
and was engaged in a geopolitical battle for the allegiance of the Third World with the Soviet 
Union. As a result, the U.S could not publicly align itself too closely with the Belgian’s attempt 
to fracture the Congo. Furthermore, Belgium’s actions undermined the U.S broad principle that 
ex-colonies enter the Free World as functioning nation-states.         
Instead, the United States would support the United Nations, which had its own 
prerogatives, before being forced by UN failures to find an indigenous collaborator who could 
hold the country together. The man who would emerge was the Army Chief of Staff, Joseph-
Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko). The U.S’s ability to find their own strong man would 
have drastic effects on the country’s alignment in the future.    
By 1964, the secessions had ended but the discontent continued. During the mid-1960s, 
local rebellions persisted in the Congo. Once again, the United States was reluctant to get 
involved directly. In extremis they now urged Belgium to suppress the insurgency. This resulted 
in the installation of Tshombe as Congolese national prime minister. The belief was that 
Tshombe, who retained an army of mercenaries, would be able to suppress the rebellion.
17
  
Tshombe was ultimately unsuccessful and the U.S and Belgium had to hire more 
mercenaries. Once the rebellions were crushed, Tshombe was quickly dismissed by the president 
of the Congo, Joseph Kasavubu. While the United States was willing to let the Belgians take the 
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lead in suppressing the rebellions of the mid-1960s, the CIA would help Joseph Mobutu take 
control of the country on November 25, 1965.
18
 From this point on, the Congo would drift 
further and further into America’s sphere of influence. This is how unipolarity was able to 
develop. Former metropoles, like Belgium, could no longer maintain stability in their overseas 
territories. As a result, the United States would step in to keep the former colony within the 
Western camp. In the case of the Congo, America would install Joseph Mobutu to rule the 
country, which he did from 1965 to 1997. While the Cold War is generally understood as a clash 
between the U.S and USSR, the Congo Crisis was primarily a contest between two NATO allies. 
The United States competed against the Belgians for Congolese alignment – and won.  
World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires are integral 
aspects to my proposed theory of polar co-option. These two multinational empires were broken 
apart and consolidated into the spheres of influence of other great powers before, during, and 
after World War II. This process of polar co-option would unfold a second time after World War 
II.  The Austro-Hungarian Empire was ultimately contested between Nazi Germany and the 
USSR.On the other hand, the Western powers of France and Britain divided the former Ottoman 
Empire. Under the guise of mandates and working through local actors like the Hashemites, the 
Middle East was reconstructed and divided. Britain administered the mandates for Iraq and 
Palestine. The former being a completely new state created to include the three Ottoman 
provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Trans-Jordan was also invented and administered by 
the British. The French received the mandate for Syria and created Lebanon in much the same 
way Britain created Trans-Jordan.
19
     
                                                          
18
 David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Interventions: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy 
in the Congo Crisis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 199), 163.  
19
 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO; 
Westview Press, 2009), 164.   
9 
 
 Just as a large part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire eventually fell into the sphere 
of the USSR, the dismantled Ottoman Empire ultimately passed from the British and French to 
the Americans. While the British retained a military presence in the Middle East after World War 
II, the United States knew that the former colonial power could not contain perceived Soviet 
penetrations on its own, especially as the Cold War progressed. As Douglas Little points out, 
during the early years of the conflict “the Truman administration fully expected the Royal Navy 
to promote stability and to project Western seapower from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf. But 
increasingly heavy-handed Soviet pressure on Turkey to grant the Red Navy free passage 
through the Dardanelles and disturbing indications that Britain lacked both the financial 
resources and the political will to fulfill its military obligation in the Eastern Mediterranean soon 
prompted U.S policymakers to rethink their low-profile tactics in the region.”
20
  
 While I have made overarching statements about polar co-option, the point needs to be 
made that there were numerous turning points and alternative pathways encountered along the 
way to America’s hegemony. It was by no means a systematic inevitability; Egypt is a perfect 
example of this. In 1936 Egypt was firmly in the hands of the British. They had just reached an 
agreement that gave the Egyptians their independence while Britain retained a military presence 
in the Suez Canal Zone. Britain also retained the right to militarily intervene if a foreign power 
attacked Egypt.
21
 The situation swung in the other direction in 1952 when the Egyptian monarch, 
King Faruq was deposed by a military coup. The leaders of the coup, the strongest being a young 
colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser, called themselves the Free Officers Movement. The first 
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objective of this new regime was to firmly establish Egyptian independence from foreign 
exploitation and end the British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone.
22
 
 Nasser would continue to be a destabilizing force until his death in 1970. He actively vied 
for control of the Middle East and pushed Egypt deeper into the Soviet sphere. The man who 
succeeded him, Anwar Sadat, reversed course and returned Egypt into the Western camp. Sadat’s 
expelling of Soviet advisors and his willingness to make peace with Israel after the October War 
were so popular with U.S officials that America quickly resumed aid to Egypt on a scale 
unparalleled since the Marshall Plan in Europe. America’s massive aid program was to assure 
Sadat’s position in Egyptian politics. He had promised his compatriots that a close association 
with the West would produce a “peace dividend” in the form of social and material progress.
23 
American officials understood that if these improvements did not materialize Sadat, along with 
his pro-Western stance, would not last and the U.S position in the Middle East would suffer a 
setback. Therefore, they decided to “underwrite” Sadat’s pledges. 
There are a number of lessons we can discern from the example of Egypt. The first is that 
a country’s allegiance is not static but is subject to change. The second is that Egypt went 
through a long process which involved shifting alignments more than once but eventually ended 
up being allied with the United States. Though Nasser had tried to build up his military through 
Soviet auspices his humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel made it clear to Sadat and 
other Egyptians that the U.S could offer more than the Russians with fewer stipulations. This is 
an important point because eventually the USSR could no longer compete with the United States 
as it had been in Egypt, confirming inevitable dominance to the latter. This process has been 
carried out on a global scale. It ought to be said, however, that Egypt took its particular path 
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towards U.S alignment. Other countries traveled down different routes but the majority of them 
eventually became part of the American sphere of influence.    
This paper has argued that the “collapse of the Soviet Union, while closely bound up with 
the Cold War, was also the long-delayed result of a process of disintegration of multinational 
empires that was one of the key legacies of World War I … [Though] that war destroyed other 
empires, the Tsarist empire had continued under ‘new management’ as the Soviet Union.”
24
 The 
United States, on the other hand, absorbed into its military and economic orbit the majority of the 
possessions of the former multinational empires that were previously in existence. This co-option 
process legitimized and grew the liberal international order that the United States wanted to 
establish. As a result, unipolarity came into existence. It was not just the mere collapse of the 
Soviet Union but the culmination of a process of geopolitical consolidation that began almost 
two centuries ago. At this present moment, however, I will not undertake the task of describing 
the totality of this process. Instead, this paper will focus on the integral aspect of polar co-option 
of previously held Western possessions; specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 After World War II, the United States found itself as the most powerful country in the 
world. The international system, on the other hand, was in disarray. The former multinational 
empires that had characterized the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were beginning to 
collapse and a process of decolonization was starting to develop. This process would unfold 
throughout a number of decades because it occurred in waves. U.S leadership wanted stability so 
Europe and Japan could be rebuilt within their respective home regions of the Free World and 
Soviet penetrations countered. By contrast, the United States stepped in to replace moribund 
colonial powers in the global periphery. This led to conflicts between the burgeoning superpower 
and its weaker NATO allies. In the Congo, United States policymakers were ready and able to 
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back Joseph Mobutu rather than allow the country to remain in Belgian hands. They were willing 
to do this because they felt Mobutu gave them a better chance of maintaining stability in a 
country plagued by internal dissension.  
 Rather than the United States being imperial, however, it was rather reluctant to assume 
colonialist burdens. In terms of its commitments to Western Europe, Geir Lundestad has written 
extensively about the concept of “Empire by Invitation.” He has concluded, “the invitations 
clearly had an effect. Obviously there would not have been any economic assistance had the 
Europeans not wanted it. Considering Washington’s initially lukewarm response to Bevin’s pleas 
for an Atlantic security system, it seems likely the setting up of NATO would at least have been 
substantially delayed had it not been for the European invitations.”
25
  
 In the Third World, the United States for the most part was reluctant as well. This created 
some interesting paradoxes in Africa South of the Sahara, where the first objective, according to 
a 1950 State Department planning paper, was to “cooperate with the responsible governments in 
the political, economic and social advancement of the people of Africa at the maximum 
practicable rate. This meant that at first, despite overall American anti-colonialism, “in the 
orderly and progressive development of their African dependent territories and in maintaining 
the present political stability in those areas.” Furthermore, the U.S government tried to “make 
every effort to dispel whatever suspicions the Metropolitan Governments might have [had] that 
[their] actions [were] designed to bring about indiscriminate self-government in the African 
dependent areas.”
26
 With regards to the Belgian Congo, the American policy was to “urge the 
Belgians, whenever the opportunity arises, to promote the political, economic, social and 
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educational advancement of the native inhabitants with a view to advancing them along the road 
to self-government.”
27
 There was no explicit desire on the part of the Americans to replace the 
Belgians as the purveyor of stability. The goal was to have the Belgians develop institutions in 
the Congo that would integrate into the American-led international liberal order.  
 The Congo Crisis was not the only instance when the United States clashed with a 
NATO ally. During the 1950s oil nationalization crisis in Iran, the Truman administration tried to 
mediate a settlement and felt the British were being too obstinate. Furthermore, they regarded 
military intervention unacceptable except only under extreme circumstances. These scenarios 
involved evacuating British citizens whose lives were in danger and in the case of a Soviet 
attack. While the United States had “grave misgivings” about an intervention in Iran, the British 
ambassador had already floated the idea to U.S policy makers.
28
 
 In Vietnam the Truman administration began to underwrite the French struggle against 
Ho Chi Minh, pledging $60 million dollars in 1952. Eisenhower, on the other hand, urged the 
French to grant independence to Vietnam if hostilities were to cease. The French did not 
acquiesce but began to concentrate their troops within the northern garrison of Dien Bien Phu. 
When the outpost was about to be overrun, the Eisenhower administration approached 
congressional leaders to gage their support for a resolution authorizing American troops into the 
fight. The Congressmen were aghast at Eisenhower’s request. Furthermore, when Vice-President 
Richard Nixon made a speech calling for U.S entry into the war, the public’s reaction was so 
vehemently against the idea that it was never mentioned again. While the U.S was reluctant to 
get directly involved in the conflict, it was still underwriting 75 percent of the cost of the war.
29
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 In all three cases, Iran, Vietnam, and the Congo, the United States clashed with their 
NATO allies and eventually had to become deeply involved in countries that were previously not 
in its sphere of influence. At first American officials urged the colonial metropoles to resolve 
their differences with the indigenous population so stability could be maintained. Once it became 
clear that the European powers were no longer able to prevail, the U.S sought new formulae. 
This was the option of last resort though with the U.S even willing to foot the bill, in some 
instances, if the former colonial power was willing to send their own men or even mercenaries to 
do the fighting. American politicians were not bellicose about sending troops and more often 
than not they wanted the former colonial powers to handle the affairs within what had been their 
spheres of influence. 
  This pattern of trying to maintain stability was repeated in a number of locations 
throughout the world and is an integral aspect of my theory of polar co-option. While I have 
briefly sketched this process, the remainder of this paper will examine how the Congo was 
transferred from the Belgian sphere of influence to the American. I will try to demonstrate that 
the United States’ chief objective was to maintain stability in order to prevent communist 
inroads. Rather than take the lead, the U.S tried to push the former colonial power, in this case 
Belgium, to fulfill its responsibilities, albeit disinterestedly, on behalf of Free World desiderata. 
Only when this option failed was the U.S willing to take on the task of maintaining stability. 
Nevertheless, because of America’s position in the international arena, more often than not the 
former colonial possession found itself within America’s orbit so it could be retained by the Free 
World. This is how unipolarity developed. The United States’ endless quests for stability in 
combination with its global struggle against the USSR for Third World allegiance led them to 
rectify discontent within the international system and maintain the status quo. As a result, the 
15 
 
world characterized by multinational empires became consolidated into one sphere of influence - 
that of the United States. 
        
 The Congo: Transition in Alignment  
 
 
The United States’ association with the Congo dates back to the nineteenth century. In 
1878, the Belgian monarch, King Leopold II, hired the famed American explorer, Henry Morton 
Stanley, “to establish trading posts in the Congo area, to forge alliances with local chieftains, and 
overall to create a sphere of influence.”
30
 In a secondary capacity, Stanley would act as a 
representative of Leopold in America. Stanley’s lobbying on behalf of Leopold was successful in 
1884, when the United States, along with Germany, was the first to recognize Leopold’s 
Association Internationale du Congo as the sovereign power in the Congo basin. The United 




 Despite this early contact, the United States’ experience with the Congo at the outbreak 
of World War II was limited. American officials had always viewed Africa as within the 
European sphere of influence and therefore altered their policies to suit the Europeans. This 
would change only slightly during the war because the Belgians remained stringent against U.S 
penetration into their colony. On June 16, 1942, the Belgian government in exile in London and 
the United States signed a preliminary agreement that brought the former into Lend-Lease. Since 
the Nazis were occupying Belgium, the latter’s reciprocal contributions to the Allied cause had 
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to come from the Congo.
32
 A number of difficulties would arise as a result.  The European 
country estimated that it “furnished the Allied armies the equivalent of some $400,000,000 in 
supplies and services.”
33
 Rations became particularly scarce in the colony since Belgian officials 
procured “the most needed items of food in the Belgian Congo, namely fats.”
34
   
 The Belgians also insisted that all American contact with the Congo should go through 
metropolitan officials. The Colonial Minister, Baron Albert de Vleeschauwer, was not happy 
with the agreement. Under the guidelines the Congo would have to finance the training and 
maintenance of American troops in the colony. There were over twelve hundred by August 1941 
and their numbers would increase.
35
 
 In response, de Vleeschauwer argued that the June 16 agreement did not include the 
Congo. Traditionally, a treaty signed with Belgium only pertained to the metropole unless the 
Congo was specifically mentioned. Under the circumstances of World War II, however, 
precedent would be eschewed for expediency. Furthermore, the Free French had set a wartime 
example by involving their colonies in Lend-Lease. If the Belgians did not follow the French, it 
could be interpreted as the former serving opportunistic self-advantage instead of the Allied 
cause. Thus from the very beginning the Congo became the focal point of Belgian-American 
consternation.    
 Another problem arose over compensation. The United States could offer more money 
for Congolese products than the United Kingdom. A U.S cable complained, “Congo producers 
have received offers from the United States for example for palm oil and rubber at prices of 
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pounds 40 to pounds 50 and 14 pence, respectively, as against United Kingdom prices of pounds 
18 and 8 ½ pence, the Belgian Government finds itself in a difficult position.”
36
 In the same 
document it was stated “the Belgians would rather have dollars than pounds.” In order to 
mitigate the discrepancy in resources, the British successfully approached the Americans, who 
agreed to sign a tripartite agreement instead of a bilateral one. Difficulties would persist until the 
three parties agreed to end the talks in 1943.  
 Rather than reach a new agreement, the participants decided that the Board of Economic 
Warfare (later renamed the Office of Economic Warfare) could assume responsibility for 
American operations in the colony. The agency would send a mission to the Congo in 1943. 
While the United States’ knowledge of the Congolese peoples was not sophisticated, extensive 
business ties were maintained. The United States was the colony’s second largest trading 
partner.
37
 These connections would come into play when the Office of Economic Warfare’s 
mission bypassed thorny diplomatic issues and directly established relations with private Belgian 
interests inside the Congo. Though the Belgian government protested, the board continued its 
operations, making further contact with local European businessmen.   
 In addition to the problem of resource allocation, the Congo’s uranium deposits brought 
America closer to Belgian commercial interests in the Congo. The United States’ atomic energy 
research was slow to get under way in comparison to Germany and the U.K. The situation would 
change, when the Manhattan Engineer District was formed and the Brigadier General, Leslie 
Groves was put in charge. The first concern for Groves was the insufficient amount of uranium 
in the United States.
38
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 Luckily for Groves, during the late 1930s the managing director, Edgar Sengier, of the 
Belgian mining company Union Minière du Haut Katanga was a prescient businessman who 
understood the growing demand for uranium. Previously, the ore had been primarily used to 
color ceramics. Sengier had heard about the new destructive application of the raw material and 
made arrangements to have 1,139 tons of his company’s surplus uranium sent from its 
Shinkolobwe mines in the Congo to Staten Island. Leslie Groves started to buy from Sengier 
directly in 1942.   
 This direct contact between the American government and Belgian businessmen in the 
Congo was exactly what the Belgian government in exile had wanted to avoid. They would be 
brought into the picture, however, when Sengier and the United States could no longer agree on a 
price for future ore deliveries. Previously, the Belgian government had been unaware that 
“Sengier had already sold ores containing over four thousand tons of uranium oxide” to the U.S. 
With the Belgian government now involved negotiations stalled. 
 Notions of prestige would play heavily into the discussions, with Belgium trying to use 
their uranium deposits to enter into the Anglo-American alliance on atomic energy, which was 
established on August 19, 1943. The two most problematic issues were control over the uranium 
deposits and sharing of research. The Belgian government wanted to retain the ability to use ore 
not required for military purposes in their own industries. Furthermore, any commercial research 
regarding uranium would have to be shared. The Belgians wanted to restore their position in the 
international community after the war and felt their ores could assure this. The United States, on 
19 
 
the other hand, believed “the deposits in the Belgian Congo should be exploited as rapidly as 
possible and the material, both high grade and low grade, removed to safe territory.”
39
 
 The agreement the four parties drew up accounted for 3,440,000 pounds of uranium 
oxide.
40
 The U.S and U.K pledged to “facilitate the delivery to the producing company (Union 
Minière du Haut Katanga) of such materials…necessary for the reopening and development” of 
the Shinkolobwe mines. The two aforementioned countries would also gain the right of first 
refusal to all the ore produced in the Belgian Congo for ten years. There was a stipulation, 
however, to the last provision. The Belgian government insisted that they should retain the right 
“to reserve such reasonable quantities of the said ores as may be required for her own scientific 
research and for her own industrial purposes.”  
 In addition to safeguarding its own endeavors, the Belgians insisted on cooperation in 
terms of sharing scientific research. If the U.S and U.K began to utilize uranium for commercial 
purposes the two governments were required to “admit the Belgian Government to participation 
in such utilization on equitable terms.” The ultimate authority, however, remained with the two 
great powers. Belgium was not allowed to use its own ore for commercial purposes without 
“consultation and in agreement with” the U.S and U.K. The last stipulation would be particularly 
painful to the Belgians, who had desired to use their uranium as a bargaining chip to bring 
themselves closer to the great powers and in turn elevate their status in the international 
community.  
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 Prior to World War II, United States contact with the Belgian Congo was primarily 
through Belgian companies within the colony. This would prove to be of some benefit during the 
war, when the U.S bypassed the Belgian government on two occasions and signed agreements 
with private actors. When it came to procurement of raw materials and uranium the U.S found it 
easier to come to an agreement with private interests than with the Belgian government; the latter 
being more concerned with notions of prestige and insecure about their small power status. 
Furthermore, the Belgian government was wary of American designs on the Congo and tried to 
distance the former from the latter whenever possible. The historian Jonathan Helmreich 
described the situation in these terms: “Though only one among many issues at the time, the 
matter of United States relations – economic but more importantly political – with the colony 
would become a more serious problem for both Brussels and Washington as years passed.
41
 
 During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt espoused Wilsonian notions of self-
determination. He opposed old-style colonialism and wanted the British to grant India its 
independence, the Dutch to relinquish the N.E.I., and the French to get out of Indochina.
42
  
He attempted to articulate his beliefs in the Atlantic Charter, which he signed along with the 
British Prime Minster, Winston Churchill, on August 14, 1941. Though its interpretation was 
disputed by Roosevelt and Churchill, the two leaders pledged to “respect the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign 
rights and self-government resorted to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”
43
 In 
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order to work towards this goal, Roosevelt proposed that Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam be 
placed under a four-power trusteeship after the war.
44
  
 Roosevelt’s idealism would give way to Truman’s pragmatism as World War II came to a 
close and the Cold War began. In ways often misunderstood by Cold War historians, Roosevelt 
anticipated a post-war world framed by spheres of influence within a multilateral United Nations 
framework maintained by the so-called Four Policemen: the United States, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and China. In FDR’s mind, the USSR would feel secure in such an arrangement 
and act cooperatevly.
45
 Truman redefined this notion and was determined to be firm with the 
Soviets, especially in regards to Poland. Truman would have very heated conversations with the 
USSR’s Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, when the latter visited the White House in April 
of 1945. “Molotov’s repeated attempts to gain the advantage by applying the Yugoslavian 
‘model’ to Poland, thus essentially acquiring another sphere of influence,” was met with sharp 
rebukes from the American president.  
 As Roosevelt’s vision of a post-war world gave way to the new realities of geopolitical 
divisions and outright opposition between the U.S and USSR, America’s position on colonialism 
also shifted. “American interest in dependent areas ha[d] traditionally been based on a broad 
humanitarian concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of th[ose] areas and a desire not to see 
th[ose] areas exploited for the benefit of a single power.”
46
 In terms of territory that was formally 
under a mandate, on the other hand, “prior historical claims of the mandatory powers will lead, it 
is assumed, to their being designated as administering authorities in the same territories over 
which they formally controlled.” 
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 As the Cold War progressed, these two competing views would continue to plague U.S 
policy makers. Should they adhere to their tradition and champion self-determination or support 
the former European powers maintain their spheres of influence? During the early Cold War 
years, America’s top priority was reconstructing the European economy. United States policies 
pertaining to the underdeveloped world evolved slowly with the 1940s being a period of 
transition.
47
 By 1949, the Truman administration was beginning to be pulled in the direction of 
supporting the former colonial powers, who were now NATO allies. The Cold War had just 
reached new heights with the Soviet Union successfully testing a nuclear device on August 29, 
1949 and Mao’s victory in China later that year. But this had to be balanced against the 
significance of the nationalist leaders who emerged during and after World War II and who were 
beginning to gain more prominence in the international arena. These figures included but were 
not limited to India’s Nehru, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh, and Indonesia’s Sukarno.   
 Prior to the events in China and Russia, Truman had outlined his desire to implement a 
technical assistance program to underdeveloped countries. It called for “technical cooperation 
and fostering of capital investment, which would aid underdeveloped countries in their efforts to 
improve their living standards.”
48
 It was also an attempt to try and combat Soviet propaganda 
that painted the United States as a supporter of colonialism. Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
framed the program in these terms, the “objective was to make clear in our own country and to 
all the world the purpose of American life and the purpose of the American system. That purpose 
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is to enable the individual to attain the freedom and dignity, the fullness of life which should be 
the purpose of all government and of all life on this earth.”
49
 
 As a result of America’s reorientation in regards to the underdeveloped regions of the 
world, a reexamination of its African policy was in order. In 1950, the State Department gathered 
“prominent experts in the academic field; representatives of commercial, philanthropic and 
religious interests in Africa; and experts on UN affairs.”
50
 Their report stressed America’s 
problem in regards to the African colonies: “Our representatives referred to the dual approach 
which the nature of our African problem imposes up us, because of our desire to utilize our 
assistance to further the aspirations of the African peoples towards economic betterment and 
development, and our desire to assist in the development of mutually profitable economic 
relationships between the European countries and the African colonies.” While American 
tradition was to espouse self-determination, the Truman administration’s “important interest in 
seeing that developments in the area take place in an orderly and stable manner because of [their] 
deep interest in the metropolitan powers and their interest in Africa” would take precedence.  
 Nevertheless, the group of advisors “called attention to the administrative difficulties 
confronting colonialism in the twentieth century, referring to the inadequacies in numbers and in 
technical skills among the Africans if governments are to deal competently with the many 
problems which arise in a developing society.”
51
 The advisors also brought up the burgeoning 
nationalist movements: the document states, “A further factor is that of the developing nationalist 
movements and aspirations in the African territories…which is capable only of being retarded 
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but not checked. Although the African peoples are lacking in resources and skills, the leaders of 
such movements are in no sense deterred by these deficiencies.”
52
  
 Ultimately, the consultants believed the United States could play a decisive role in the 
development of Africa. Aid should be given to countries that were developing towards self-
determination and the U.S should support such goals. On the other hand, it was urged upon the 
Truman administration “that a society must be equipped with a measure of certain skills among 
the indigenous population to warrant independence under modern conditions, and that therefore 
it will be necessary to cooperate with the metropolitan powers rather than to put our weight 
behind the independence movements until the societies have become richer in skills.”
53
 
Between February 27 and March 2, 1950, U.S diplomats and consular officers from all 
over Africa met for a West and East African Regional Conference in Lourenco Marques, 
Mozambique to coordinate policy. They concluded that while “American foreign policies are 
determined primarily by the attitudes of European metropolitan powers…[they should] be 
depicted in Africa in terms of African interests…Policy presentations keyed to European 
interests and levels of sophistication have only a limited appeal.”
54
 There was also an agreement 
that development needed to take place in Africa, but it was still decidedly within the European 
sphere of influence. As a State Department policy paper clearly states, “The United States has 
recently demonstrated interest in the development of Africa through aid…In general, we believe 
that our economic goals in Africa should be achieved through coordination and cooperation with 
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the colonial powers. We do not desire to initiate programs in those areas which might cause 
friction among the United States, metropolitan powers, and the colonial peoples.”
55
    
Moreover, “Belgium as a colonial power present[ed] no major political problems to the 
U.S.”
56
 The main objective was keeping raw material exports maintained, especially uranium. 
However, the second concern was the perceived constant “Communist efforts to obtain the 
allegiance of colonial peoples.” As a result, the State Department concluded “constructive 
colonial policies on the part of the administering authorities are essential to the welfare of the 
entire free world.” Even though Belgium was considered a stable colonial power, they were 
“highly sensitive to any criticism of her colonial administration, or any action which she 
considers an infringement of her responsibilities as administering authority.” 
Just as 1949 was a seminal year in American foreign policy, 1953 can be seen as a 
turning point in USSR-Third World relations. That year the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, died 
and Nikita Khrushchev ascended to First Secretary. The former was a doctrinaire Marxist who 
adhered to a strict interpretation of Lenin’s stages of development and believed the lack of an 
established labor class in most Third World countries precluded them from ever reaching true 
socialism. As a result, he came to the conclusion that self-proclaimed Third World communist 
movements should be used to further Soviet aims in the global Cold War. Stalin believed even 
under the best political circumstances the ability for Third World communist countries to 
transform their societies successfully was so narrow to be almost nonexistent.
57
  
Khrushchev wanted to soften the competition of the Cold War. Rather than armed 
excursions like the Korean War, the new Soviet leader would vie for influence in the Third 
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World. The historian Odd Arne Westad described Khrushchev’s policies in these terms: the 
Soviet leader “emphasized the government-to-government links that could be built not only with 
self-declared socialist regimes – such as China – but also the radical bourgeois regimes…such as 
Sukarno’s Indonesia, Nasser’s Egypt, or Nehru’s India.”
58
 As the United States and the USSR 
contended to gain the allegiance of burgeoning Third World nationalists, the non-aligned leaders 
began to develop an identity of their own in the political space this competition created.  
 The first wave of nationalist leaders was concerned more with domestic issues than 
foreign policy. Their chief objectives were generally to stabilize their countries and to create 
functioning governments. As the superpower competition started to heat up, Third World leaders 
began to understand their importance in the international system. There growing sense of identity 
culminated in the 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia. While there the leaders 
tried to formulate a consensus on how to play, while not as important in comparative terms – but 
a uniquely a newly influential bloc. The importance of the Bandung conference was partly a 
result of its timing several African countries were vying for independence and the French had 
just withdrawn from Indochina.
59
 
While the United States and Britain feared the conference would provoke greater anti-
colonial sentiment, the five sponsoring countries (India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon) 
attempted to cultivate a moderate tone.
60
 The most significant outcome might have been the 
conference’s call for economic changes; for example, increased freight rates, collective 
bargaining to raise commodity prices, and exchange of information on oil prices. In terms of 
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Africa, the conference was an inspiration to the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, who used 
Bandung to justify his pan-African aspirations.
61
      
The year 1955 also marked a slow shift in American foreign policy in regards to Africa. 
During the Truman and early Eisenhower years, the United States publicly supported African 
nationalists’ calls for self-determination, while U.S “policies [were] determined primarily by the 
attitudes of European metropolitan powers.” In a very candid letter to Mason Sears, President of 
the UN Trusteeship Council and an advocate for African independence, the U.S Consul in 
Nairobi described the U.S’s position: “Is self-determination a right that is axiomatic, automatic 
and divinely bestowed? Or is it a right that one must earn?...I think that upon reflection nearly all 
of us would agree that the latter is closer to the truth. Does a child have an ‘unalienable right’ to 
self-determination?...Could an all-African government in East Africa, the Belgian Congo or 
French Equatorial Africa, presently meet its international obligations?...Whether one calls it 
‘colonialism’ or ‘paternalism’ or what have you, some form of foreign protection to the African 
territories is likely to be necessary for quite some time to come.”
62
     
Despite this clear support for the European powers, the Deputy Director of the African 
affairs division within the State Department, Fred L. Hadsel, advocated in 1955 that the U.S start 
to formulate its own policy agendas in Africa rather than rely on the colonial powers. While 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would not immediately act upon Hadsel’s suggestions, he 
would in time. “A year later a new position of deputy assistant secretary of state for African 
affairs was created in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. The Office 
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of African Affairs was divided, and Hadsel himself became director of the Office of Southern 
African Affairs.”
63
 Embassy and consulate staffs were also increased.  
Even with these changes, the Eisenhower administration reported: “As a result of the 
deadlock on policy in regard to the relationship of the metropoles to the newly developing 
countries, there were no fully agreed basic NSC or OCB papers providing authoritative guidance 
for African affairs.”
64
 From a policy stand point this was where America was when the Congo 
Crisis began. It was caught in the vice of supporting nationalist leaders while alienating their 
NATO allies or having to back the colonial powers with the fear that the Soviet Union would 
become the champion of self-determination. While privately, the U.S wanted the colonial powers 
to retain their spheres of influence in Africa, publicly it was untenable for them to state such a 
position.  
 In the Belgian Congo, the Eisenhower administration believed its “defense and economic 
arrangements with the Western European countries as well as [their] interest in seeing the 
dependent African peoples progress in an orderly fashion toward self-government c[ould] both 
be served in the Congo by acting through the metropolitan government.”
65
 But if the Belgians 
were not able to meet their obligations in the future, “the importance of the Congo…as a prime 
source of critical raw materials, United States aid, if a need for it developed, would have a fairly 
high priority.”
66
 The United States should act tactfully, however, because of the “rather unusual 
sensitivities of the Belgians which [were] motivated by fears of losing the Congo and their 
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suspicion that anti-colonialist tendencies might lead the United States to take positions 
undercutting them there.” 
 Though the United States felt the Belgians were able to maintain stability in the Congo, 
cracks began to present themselves in the late 1950s. On October 6, 1957, a State Department 
official was sent on a ten week tour of Africa. He came to the conclusion that the “virus of self-
government has reached the Congo and there appeared to be a rather recent realization on the 
part of the Belgian officials of its potential strength…There was substantial evidence of African 




 There were a number of reasons why the Congolese began to agitate for self-
determination. An economic boom during the 1950s precipitated urbanization. By 1955, the 
urban population made up twenty two percent of the country.
68
 A new social class would 
emerge, the évolués. The new industries that developed in the Congo needed skilled African 
laborers. These individuals spoke French, practiced Christianity, and were generally more 
westernized and therefore more evolved than their “primitive” countrymen. These évolués 
furthered their political aspirations by forming clubs. Three hundred and seventeen separate 
clubs, with a total membership of fifteen thousand, existed in 1956.
69
 Some of these 
organizations developed into full-fledged political institutions. The most influential was the 
Alliance des Bakongos (ABAKO) led by the future president, Joseph Kasavubu. Most of these 
clubs were organized around ethnic lines and would thus contribute to the country’s 
fragmentation.  
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 Possibly more important than the internal changes were the international ones. 
Throughout Africa the pre-World War II status quo was being challenged. The Sudan gained its 
independence in 1956, Ghana in 1957, and the British were fighting the Mau Mau nationalists in 
Kenya. French possessions were also going through a turbulent time. Tunisia and Morocco 
gained their independence in 1956. In Algeria, the French were trying to suppress a guerrilla 
insurgency.  
In an effort to quell the growing nationalism within French West Africa, the French 
President, Charles de Gaulle, offered independence to the remaining African colonies in 1958. 
Only one accepted, Guinea, under the leadership of Sékou Touré. De Gaulle became determined 
to make an example out of Guinea and recalled all French personnel and resources from the 
African country. France’s policy was undermined when the USSR and the newly independent 
Ghana began to assist Guinea. Rather than check African nationalism, the Guinean experience 
sped up the process.
70
 It also became an example to US policy makers, who now understood that 
the USSR was prepared to fill vacuums vacated by former metropoles in Africa.  
Congolese political agitation eventually took the form of rioting and disturbances, the 
largest of which broke out in Leopoldville in January 1959. When the colonial army, the Force 
Publique, was brought in to restore order, forty-nine Congolese lost their lives. Even though the 
Belgians claimed the cause of the riots were unemployment and tribal tensions, they did begin to 
reorient their colonial policies to advance quickly towards independence.
71
 After the January 
riots, Belgian King Baudouin announced major changes in colonial policy. The most immediate 
change was the termination of racial discrimination.
72
 The Belgian parliament also appointed a 
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commission to study colonial policy. Eventually, a plan was laid out that called for elections and 
a gradual buildup towards self-government that would take place in 1964.  
 These measures were not enough because the majority of the Congolese believed the 
Belgians would fix the elections. Kasavubu expressed such a belief to the United States. In a 
conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Satterthwaite, 
Kasavubu indicated “he had no faith in these proposed elections since he believed the Belgian 
authorities would rig them in their favor. In this connection, he protested against the nomination 




 Further rioting and the lack of voter turnout forced the Belgians to rethink their policies. 
They became “much more ready to consult with US, if not to solicit [American] advice or 
assistance.”
74
  On January 20, 1960, a Round Table Conference was convened between the 
Belgian government and representatives from the major Congolese parties. On January 27, it was 
decided that the Congo would be granted full independence on June 30, 1960. The Belgian 
Ambassador, Louis Scheyven, sat down with U.S Secretary of State Christian Herter to solicit 
his opinion on February 12, 1960. Herter said the Belgian government was handling the situation 
with “great wisdom and flexibility. He added that from over-all point of view it would have been 
better if there had been more time to work out complicated process of setting up new 
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 There were three main reasons why the Belgians were willing to grant the Congo 
independence. Belgium was never an imperial power; it was its king, Leopold II, who wanted 
colonies. The colonial administration was rather sparse with companies “that often acted as states 
within the state-colony.”
76
 The Belgian public believed everything was running smoothly until 
the riots began to break out. Once they became aware of how the Congolese felt they were not 
“sufficiently attached to the role of colonial masters to be willing to make sacrifices to remain.” 
The Belgians unwillingness to stay in the Congo was amplified by the recent French attempt to 
suppress guerilla fighters in Algeria. If France had to spend as much resources as they had to 
suppress the Algerian nationalists, how much would Belgium have to exert?   
 There were also indications that the Belgian government was willing to grant the Congo 
independence because it felt it could still rule the country in a neo-colonial manner. The civil 
administration was still dominated by Europeans. The Force Publique, while renamed the Armée 
Nationale Congolaise (ANC), was still officered by Belgians.
77
 Furthermore, the Congolese 
economy was dependent on Belgian capital and business interests. The three principal enterprises 
inside the Congo, Union Minière du Haut-Katange, Forminiere, and Compagnie du Chemin de 
Fer du Bas-Congo au Katange, were all funded by one of the largest Belgian holding companies, 
Société Général. The three companies had been given tracts of land that were part of the Kasai 
and Katanga regions and acted like governments within the state.
78
 These companies were vital 
to the Congolese economy.  
While Belgium tried to retain its position in the Congo, America’s first concern was 
communist penetration. It wanted to “avoid a repetition of the Guinean experience when the 
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Soviet Bloc moved into a vacuum after the French left.”
79
 The U.S needed to assign a competent 
ambassador to the country because it was believed the Soviets would have someone stationed in 
Leopoldville on July 1.
80
 In terms of reaching the Congolese population, the radio station in 
Leopoldville needed to be improved. These steps were significant because the “Russians [were] 
operating the Guinea radio system and Ghana is greatly strengthening its radio set-up.”
81
 
Furthermore, “Voice of America broadcasts to the Congo…appeared to be quite inadequate from 
a technical and content point of view. The only stations bringing international news clearly to the 
Congo [were] Brazzaville…Radio Cairo and Radio Moscow.” 
 U.S officials’ fear of communist penetration was augmented when the left-leaning Patrice 
Lumumba emerged as the leading political figure in the country and was named prime minister. 
A former postal clerk, Lumumba had begun his political career in the late 1950s. He had helped 
create and later led the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). The State Department described 
him as “highly articulate, sophisticated, subtle and unprincipled intelligence…He gives the 
impression of a man who would probably go far in spite of the fact that almost nobody trusts 
him.”
82
 Lumumba’s Soviet-bloc ties were disputed with some reports indicating USSR assistance 
but the “more likely explanation…[was] that Lumumba’s outside financial support [came] 
largely from Accra and possibly from Conakry and that some of these funds in turn may [have 
originated] in Soviet sources.” Allen Dulles, the CIA director, stated Lumumba was being 
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“supported by the Belgian Communists.”
83
 Either way, the U.S government believed he was 
“perfectly prepared to betray these supporters to the fullest extent that suits his purpose.”
84
 
 Two weeks before the Congo was to gain its independence, the U.S consulate gave an 
assessment of the present state of the country. It was noted that “basic elements [of] political 
instability and immaturity, lack of qualified or experienced leadership, superficial familiarity 
with inter-relationships between economic and political problems and role in family of nations, 
more painfully apparent than ever.”
85
 As a result of the chaos that might unfold in the Congo, the 
U.S had to rethink its role in the country. It was stated, “we have maintained hands-off 
policy…As Belgian influence declines and in absence any show of US interest in means of 
achieving greater political stability, question arises as to whether we should not now attempt 
exert more positive influence.” Furthermore, it became apparent that Lumumba was the only 
figure that could keep the country together and that there was “no better alternative on the 
horizon than a government built around him.”
86
 The United States was willing to accept 
Lumumba because they viewed him as an opportunist who could be bought to take Western 
positions but also as the only man who could keep the African country together.    
 After the Congo gained its independence on June 30, 1960, the country quickly 
descended into chaos. Though Lumumba and the MNC were able to garner a plurality, with 40 
seats out of 137 in the Chamber of Representatives, there were twenty-two other parties in the 
chamber, none of which held more than thirteen seats.
87
 The country immediately began to 
fragment as local power prevailed over state institutions. The collapse of the civil administration 
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was partly the result of Belgian colonial policies. Unlike their British and French counterparts, 
the Belgians generally prohibited the Congolese from receiving higher education. By 1960, there 
were no more than sixty university graduates and only one lawyer in the country.
88
 The Congo 
was also organized under ethnic lines which precluded a sense of national identity. Allen Dulles 
estimated that there were “some 80-odd political parties” in the Congo.
89
 President Eisenhower 
“said he did not know that many people in the Congo could read. Mr. Dulles said conflicts 
between tribes in the Congo would present one difficult problem.” 
 On July 5, the situation continued to deteriorate when the ANC mutinied and began to 
terrorize the country, especially Europeans. There were two reasons for the rebellion. The first 
was “Lumumba promising all government employees a pay raise – all, that is, except the 
army.”
90
 The situation was exasperated when General Emile Janssens “reportedly told his troops 
that ‘for the army, independence equals zero.’” The enlisted Congolese resented their European 
born commanders and their anger finally boiled over.  
 On July 9, the Belgian government informed the Eisenhower administration that it was 
sending troops to reestablish order and protect European lives. Though the United States had 
misgivings about the action, embassy officials were told to make it clear that they were not 
“asking reversal Belgian decision.”
91
 After Belgian troops arrived the next day, rather than 
stabilize the situation they made matters worse. Even though their mission was supposed to be 
restrictive and limited to protecting civilians, the Belgian military expanded its efforts. The most 
egregious act was when the Belgian navy shelled the port of Matadi, killing nineteen 
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 From July 10 to the end of the month, there were seven parachute operations, three 
assault-landings, and six airlift deployments.
93
  
To try and defuse the situation, the American Ambassador to the Congo, Clare 
Timberlake, came up with a plan. He argued a UN force could be put in place to maintain order, 
like in Egypt in 1956 after the Suez crisis. As the UN moved in the Belgians would gradually 
withdraw their forces. He believed this “should keep bears out of the Congo caviar” as well as 
the United States since he assumed the latter “have not yet developed a great taste for it either.”
94
 
The State Department agreed with Timberlake’s plan and told him to pursue it. On the same day, 
Timberlake drove to the Leopoldville airport where Lumumba and Kasavubu had just arrived. 
They held a one hour meeting in which the American ambassador urged the two leaders to call 
upon the UN. They heeded his advice and made the request.
95
 Though the United States did not 
“want to do a single thing…[except] under UN auspices,” it moved the aircraft carrier Wasp into 
the vicinity with marines on board.
96
 Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration would later 
refuse a request made by the Congolese Vice-Prime Minster, Antoine Gizenga, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko, and Minister of National Defense, Albert Nyembo, for US 
troops to be used to restore order. President Eisenhower felt the U.S “would be completely in 
error to go in unilaterally.”
97
 Furthermore, he believed “Turkish or Pakistani troops [should be 
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used] if [the UN] can’t get African troops.” He felt Western soldiers should not be sent to the 
Congo.     
 The U.S decision to use the UN to maintain stability in the Congo marks a clear break in 
Belgian-American relations. Lumumba and Kasavubu framed their request for UN assistance in 
terms of protecting their country from Belgian aggression. To exasperate the situation, Lumumba 
stated that if aid was not forthcoming he would appeal to the “Bandung Treaty Powers.”
98
 The 
U.S State Department interpreted Lumumba’s remarks as a veiled threat to call in Communist 
China.
99
  Furthermore, the resolution that passed the UN Security Council on July 14 called upon 
the Belgian government to withdraw its forces. U.S support for such wording angered the 
Belgians who felt betrayed. They wished the United States had abstained from voting like the 
British and French.
100
 By now, the Eisenhower administration did not believe the Belgians could 
maintain stability in the Congo and was hoping they could use the UN to achieve those ends.  
 The situation continued to escalate when the two most mineral rich provinces in the 
Congo seceded from the central government. The first was the copper rich region of Katanga on 
July 11 under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. The United States was not caught off guard. 
During a May 5, National Security Council meeting, Allen Dulles, remarked, “there is some 
possibility that a movement might develop in the rich Katanga area for separation from the 
Congo and union with Rhodesia.”
101
 Tshombe had also approached US officials on June 22 to 
inquire whether the U.S would recognize an independent Katanga. The response he received was 
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not “under present circumstances.” The Eisenhower administration surmised correctly that 
“Union Minière and local military back[ed] Tshombe.”
102
  
The chief American concern was keeping the Congo’s mineral reserves in the possession 
of the Free World and accessible to NATO in the case of a war. A second reason why the United 
States did not discourage Tshombe was the belief “that if the assets of Katanga could be retained, 
the economy of the Congo could be throttled. The Soviets would have to throw a lot of money 
into the rest of the Congo to keep it viable in such a case. The President [even] suggested that the 
UN might recognize Katanga.”
103
    
 In addition to Belgian interests supporting and financing Katanga, the diamond rich 
region of South Kasai seceded in August of 1960 under the leadership of Albert Kalonji. Though 
not as lucrative as Katanga, South Kasai had substantial Belgian holdings, including the 
influential company Forminiere. While on paper South Kasai’s government was African, the 
Belgians dominated and effectively ran the province.
104
 
These two secessions and the Belgian presence in the Congo would cause Lumumba’s 
clash with the United Nations and eventual removal. The first UN peacekeepers began to arrive 
from Tunisia on July 15. Ultimately, troop levels reached a peak of 20,000 and came from 
around 30 countries.
105
 While the United States did not want to unilaterally get involved in the 
Congo, it was perfectly comfortable working through UN auspices. There were a number of 
Americans advising the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold. Two field directors for the 
Congo mission, Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier, were both Americans and former State 
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 Though the United Nations provided humanitarian efforts and “assumed responsibility 
for assisting the Congolese government in providing the essential services of an independent 
state,”
107
 its role in the conflict was disputed. Once UN troops began to flood the country, 
Belgian soldiers were supposed to withdraw to their bases. In most regions this occurred. In 
Katanga and South Kasai, however, the Belgians remained “despite assurances total withdrawal 
would, and later, had taken place.”
108
 As the days turned into weeks, Lumumba continued to vent 
his frustration at Belgium’s attempt to divide the Congo. His speeches also served the dual 
purpose of consolidating his legitimacy inside the country. On August 12, Ambassador 
Timberlake complained “that Lumumba is moving steadily toward very strong dictatorship…he 
will establish a dictatorship if he can get away with it.
109
 Five days later, Timberlake indicated 
that the UN forces were not providing enough stability. He wrote, “I would hate to stand here 
and watch this gambit played out under the noses of an impotent UN military force.”
110
 
 Lumumba also believed the UN forces were not being used properly. On August 9, a 
second UN Security Council resolution was passed calling for the Belgians to remove their 
troops. It also “reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo would ‘not be a party to or 
in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, 
                                                          
106
 David N. Gibb, “The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of ‘Impartiality’: 
Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960,” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 38 No. 3 (Sep. 
2000), 365. 
107
 James Dobbins, et al, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 12. 
108
 “Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” September 5, 1960, 
FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, 458.  
109
 Clare H. Timberlake, “Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State,” August 
12, 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, 408. 
110
 Clare H. Timberlake, “Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State,” August 





 Lumumba, on the other hand, believed “that in its intervention in 
the Congo the United Nations is not to act as neutral organization but rather that the Security 
Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of [his] Government.” He wanted to invade 
both Katanga and South Kasai with the UN force in combination with a disciplined ANC and 
restore the provinces to the central government. U.S Under Secretary Douglas Dillon outlined 
the stakes involved, “Lumumba is in fact challenging authority, prestige and usefulness of 
United Nations…[If he were to succeed it] might thus greatly retard efforts attain world peace 
through multinational approach collective security.”
112
 Thus the Eisenhower administration 
viewed Lumumba as a threat against the U.S-led approach of collective security which had been 
in place since 1945 and which it now sought to engage as a successful tool for decolonization, 
not as Lumumba’s instrument in a civil war.  
 In late August the situation changed dramatically when the USSR began to supply 
Lumumba with equipment and technicians. Soviet Ilyushin transport aircraft arrived in 
Leopoldville carrying trucks that would be used on an assault on South Kasai. Fortunately for the 
United States, the mercenaries protecting the diamond rich province were able to rout 
Lumumba’s forces. Unfortunately, the defeated army began to terrorize the population and a 
massacre ensued. Lumumba’s actions were denounced and on September 5, 1960, Kasavubu 
dismissed Lumumba as prime minster and subsequently “went home and went to bed.”
113
 Given 
Kasavubu’s weak character it is probable “the U.S. embassy and the UN” directed him.
114
 To 
replace Lumumba, Kasavubu named Joseph Ileo prime minister. The same man Ambassador 
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 Nevertheless, Lumumba was able to outmaneuver his rivals by proceeding to the 
Leopoldville radio station, where he made “an impassioned appeal to the people.” Allen Dulles 
complained, “it was not easy to run a coup in the Congo. As an indication of the lack of 
planning, Mr. Dulles pointed out that for a time Kasavubu had controlled the radio in 
Leopoldville, but that when he left the radio station it was left unguarded…[Furthermore,] 




To make matters worse, Lumumba was able to appeal to Congolese members of 
parliament. On September 7, the Chamber of Deputies voted to reinstate him and two days later 
the Senate followed suit.
117
  Kasavubu said “his forces were afraid since Lumumba had control 
major portion military and police. Senators had been afraid to vote against Lumumba.” The 
Eisenhower administration had to characterize “these events as Lumumba victory.”
118
  
The nationalist’s reinstatement as prime minister added yet another dimension to the 
continuing crisis. A rift between the United States and Dag Hammarskjold began to develop as to 
the constitutionality of Lumumba’s premiership. Hammarskjold still considered Lumumba to be 
the active prime minster because “only parliamentary action since deposition of Lumumba had 
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been to re-endorse Lumumba’s status as PM.”
119
 The US argued “old [government] loses 
caretaker status from moment new [government] is named.” In addition to these technical 
matters, countries that were part of the UN effort in the Congo, specifically Ghana, Guinea, and 
the United Arab Republic, began to complain about Hammarskjold, who appeared “as a puppet 
of the United States – an image that the secretary-general could not have appreciated.”
120
   
 On September 14, the situation began to stabilize. The Congolese Colonel Joseph-Desire 
Mobutu, with CIA backing, staged a coup and declared the suspension of parliament and the 
setting up of a student council that would govern the country. In reality, Mobutu held all the 
power. Furthermore, Lumumba became a prisoner in the prime minister’s residency and thus 
could not drum up popular discontent as before. The split between the United Nations and the 
U.S became apparent when Mobutu issued an arrest warrant for Lumumba on September 20, but 
was unable to carry it out because UN forces blocked him. The Secretary-General’s special 
representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, “felt arrest of Lumumba was not proper solution 
but ‘trick’ and believed this was bad answer to present problem.”
121
 
 On November 27, the frictions between the United Nations and the United States were 
rendered moot when Lumumba left the prime minister’s residency and evaded Mobutu’s troops. 
He attempted to make his way to the city of Stanleyville but was arrested on December 1 by the 
Congolese army and imprisoned in Thysville. Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba’s second-in-
command and the man Timberlake indicated “would presumably succeed” Lumumba if the latter 
was captured, immediately went to Stanleyville and proclaimed the independence of the 
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 At the present moment there were three Congolese provinces which had 
seceded from the central government. South Kasai, led by Albert Kalonji and Moise Tshombe’s 
Katanga, both of which were supported by the Belgians and the mining companies Forminiere 
and Union Minière du Haut Katanga. The left leaning leader Antonie Gizenga controlled 
Orientale Province and was receiving “some support from the Soviet Union and several African 
countries, but the support was very limited.”
123
  
While the Congo Crisis is generally seen as a Cold War conflict, the USSR never played 
a large role in the country. Khrushchev’s ability to denounce the United States and the United 
Nations in the international community, on the other hand, was very effective. With Belgian 
mercenaries in Katanga and the Eisenhower administration taking the position that “UN 
activities should not be directed to undermining Tshombe’s or Katanga’s position,” the Soviet 
leader could galvanize the Afro-Asian bloc against the US and the UN while seemingly being the 
champion of self-determination.
124
 This is why Hammarskjold changed course and began to 
work against the United States. The USSR and the Afro-Asian bloc’s public denunciations 
against the UN and Belgian policies were too strong to disregard because the UN’S legitimacy 
was being undermined and Hammarskjold’s leadership questioned. One of Khrushchev’s most 
vehement attacks came on September 23, 1960, at the UN General Assembly. The Soviet leader 
“delivered a long speech, which demanded among other things the ouster of Secretary-General 
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Hammarskjold and suggested his replacement by a three-man body representing the West, Soviet 
bloc, and neutral nations.”
125
      
 The U.S position continued to deteriorate as Gizenga’s influence expanded. Small scale 
riots began to break out but were soon suppressed. In the UN the Afro-Asian bloc along with the 
USSR argued that a new government should be formed which included Lumumba. On January 
10, 1961, the CIA lamented, “In the eyes of the UN Secretary General as well as of many UN 
members [Lumumba] still has legal basis to his claim for the Premiership. He may return to 
power.”
126
 On January 17, the CIA took matters into its own hands by having Mobutu deliver 
Lumumba to the Katanga government; a government that had indicated it would kill him. In a 
detailed study of the assassination, Stephen Weissman concluded, “that the US Government 
shared direct responsibility for Lumumba’s murder along with the Congo and Belgium.” 
Furthermore, the CIA station chief, Larry Devlin, “acted to prevent Washington policymakers 
from learning about, and possibly blocking Lumumba’s rendition.”
127
  
If the Eisenhower administration assassinated Lumumba it was one of its last acts in the 
Congo. On January 20, 1961, the President-elect, John F. Kennedy, moved into the White House. 
American policy under Ike had depended on the former colonial powers to maintain stability in 
their respected spheres of influence. During the Congo’s independence, however, it became 
apparent that the U.S “could not rely on Belgium.” Though the U.S turned to the UN, it was still 
the Eisenhower administration’s “objective to get the Belgians back into the Congo.”
128
 As 
                                                          
125
 “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. X, Part 1: Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union, Cyprus 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 558.  
126
 “Special National Intelligence Estimate,” January 10, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XX: Congo Crisis 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1994).   
127
 Stephen R. Weissman, “An Extraordinary Rendition,” Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 
2 April 2010, 200.  
128
 Robert H. Johnson, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 456
th
 Meeting of the National Security 
Council,” August 18, 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, 149. 
45 
 
events unfolded this goal became unattainable with the Afro-Asian bloc and the USSR publicly 
stating that nineteenth century colonialism was being propped up in the Congo.  
 By the time the Kennedy administration took office the Afro-Asian bloc was too strong to 
go against. Therefore, the main objective of the U.S was to get the Belgians to fully withdraw 
and to reunify the Congo with a civilian government. In mid-February, the US supported a 
Security Council resolution proposed by the UAR, Liberia, and Ceylon which called for the 
removal of Belgian forces from the Congo and authorized the United Nations to use force against 
the mercenaries if necessary. The resolution also called for Mobutu to step down as the head of 
the Congolese government and the reinstitution of civilian control under Joseph Ileo. 
 A series of negotiations then took place between the secessionist leaders. On February 
28, Ileo, Tshombe, and Kalonji agreed to combine their military resources in an effort to defeat 
the leftist Gizenga. In early March the first meeting took place in Tananarive, Madagascar and 
was dominated by Tshombe, who garnered an agreement for a decentralized government. In 
April, a second meeting convened in the Northern Congolese city of Coquilhatville. Central 
government officials now demanded more authority. Previously, Tshombe had violated the 
Tananarive agreement by establishing “an economic agreement with the government of Congo-
Brazzaville.”
129
 When talks broke down and Tshombe tried to leave he was arrested by the 
central government and put in prison for two months. He was released after promising that he 
would cease his secession and reintegrate Katanga; of course, the moment Tshombe got back to 
the province he recommitted himself to independence. His defiance only brought the Congolese 
government closer to the UN and the U.S. 
 The U.S was able to reach a temporary resolution with Gizenga in July 1961. The 
Congolese parliament convened for the first time since September 1960, in order to form a new 
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government. Tshombe did not attend because he was officially “ill.”
130
 Even though Gizenga 
was able to garner support at the beginning of the conference, the CIA and the UN worked to 
undermine his position. The Kennedy administration believed if Gizenga was named PM there 
would be an “unfortunate reaction at home and damage to [their] prestige abroad.”
131
 Eventually, 
Ileo was replaced as prime minster by the U.S favored Cyrille Adoula and Gizenga was named 
deputy prime minister. It was a success for the Kennedy administration since the Orientale 
secession ended and Gizenga was reincorporated into the central government.  
 In South Kasai, the situation began to stabilize as well with Albert Kalonji “playing ball” 
and appearing as a “compromiser.”
132
 As a result, all of the focus was put on Tshombe. Through 
August the United Nations, United States, and the Katanga government tried to reach a 
diplomatic solution. On August 20, however, Tshombe indicated to the Kennedy administration 
that “Katanga [was] determined to defend by force of arms its rights [and] its accomplishments 
of the past year.”
133
 Six days later Adoula sent a letter to Tshombe ordering him to come to 
Leopoldville. Adoula was able to take such measures because the UN representative, now Conor 
Cruise O’Brien, had promised to back Adoula militarily (it ought to be noted that Lumumba had 
asked for such assistance a year earlier and was rejected).  
 United Nations forces began Operation Rumpunch in Katanga on August 28, 1961. 
Although numerous mercenaries were arrested and expelled, the UN could not break the 
secession. One important factor was the presence of a single French-made Fouga Magister 
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aircraft which “inflicted enough damage and disruption to prevent the deployment of UN 
forces.”
134
 In addition to the military successes of Katanga’s hired mercenaries, European 
newspapers denounced the UN.
135
 On September 17 the situation changed dramatically when 
Dag Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash en route to the Northern Rhodesian city of Ndola 
to negotiate a ceasefire with Tshombe.  
There are a number of theories as to what actually occurred. They range from a 
mercenary being brought on board and crashing the plane to Katanga mercenaries accidentally 
shooting it down while trying to intimidate the Secretary-General. More benign explanations are 
mechanical failure or the pilot accidentally grabbing the flight chart for the city of Ndolo in the 
Congo rather than Ndola. “Aviation experts agree that the most likely explanation is what is 
know [sic] as Controlled Flight Into Terrain (C.F.I.T.). In the years following the crash at Ndola 
it has been found that pilots not infrequently make judgment errors as to altitude due to 
sensory/optical illusions.”
136
 Nevertheless, a formal ceasefire was announced between Katanga 
and the UN forces on September 20. U Thant was named Hammarskjold’s replacement in 
November. 
 While the UN-Katanga problem was thereafter in abeyance, Gizenga remerged as a 
destabilizing factor. In October he left the central government and reestablished his 
independence in Orientale Province. He was crushed, however, when UN forces arrested him on 
January 15, 1962. He would remain in prison for the duration of the conflict. South Kasai was 
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also reintegrated into the central government, when Albert Kalonji was arrested and placed in 
protective custody only two months later.
137
    
 Now that Gizenga and Kalonji were eliminated as challenges to central Congolese 
authority, the US and UN worked exclusively towards finding a solution to the Katanga 
secession. A two prong approach was developed to induce Tshombe back into the federal 
government. The first was to build up an “adequate UN military presence in Katanga.” While 
this was taking place the US government would try to put pressure on him “through the [Union 
Minière du Haut Katanga] and the Belgian government which should make clear that payment of 
export proceeds and taxed solely to Katanga government cannot be continued.” Thus the 
Kennedy administration tried to defund Tshombe while expanding UN military operations.”
138
 
 The September 20 ceasefire began to break down with small skirmishes. By the end of 
October the State Department acknowledged that “pressures in Leopoldville and in New York 
for more energetic UN actions to put an end to Katanga’s secession are building up 
dangerously.”
139
 The new Secretary-General was determined to restore order. The UN was now 
in possession of an adequate military force, which included a number of U.S Globemaster 
transport aircraft to ferry UN troops to Katanga. Fighter-bombers were also acquired but from 
Ethiopia, Sweden, and India.
140
 Operation Unokat was launched by the UN on December 14 and 
was a success. “After a week of combat, [UN troops] had suffered 10 dead and 34 wounded; the 
Katangans endured 141 dead and 401 wounded.”
141
 Furthermore, the capital of the province, 
Elisabethville, was now isolated from the country and northern Katanga was occupied.   
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 The UN victory was so decisive that Tshombe agreed to fly to the city of Kitona and 
meet with Prime Minister Adoula. A ceasefire was called, but once again, when Tshombe 
returned to Katanga he resumed his claims of independence. The Kennedy administration, rather 
than support another military effort decided to pursue a diplomatic route. They continued to 
pressure Union Minière Haut du Katanga to stop funding Tshombe and his mercenaries. The 
administration was now aided by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, a long time 
American ally.  
As a result of the pressure, the Belgian business community began to fracture in 1962.
142
 
Union Minière, however, continued to support Tshombe. Eventually the United States decided to 
back one more plan and then resort to UN military action as well as economic sanctions. 
Between July 31 and August 2 meetings were held in Washington which included 
representatives from the UK, France, and Belgium. The point of these discussions was to come 
up with a unified plan. In an August 3 memorandum Under Secretary of State George Ball 
outlined the West’s revamped policy. A new Congolese constitution would be written which 
advocated for a federal government, “the immediate sharing of tax revenues and foreign 
exchange earnings between the Central Government and the provinces; rapid reunification of 
currency; integration of armed forces; closing of provincial ‘foreign offices’ and withdrawal of 
representatives abroad; a general political amnesty; freedom of movement of UN personnel 
(including forces) over all the Congo; and representation of the Tshombe party in the National 
Government.”
143
 The vital issue of tax revenue would be solved by a clean 50/50 split of 
Katanga’s mining income between the province and the central government.    
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  In addition to formulating the agreement, the US would take a number of measures to 
strengthen the Congolese and UN forces. This included increasing aid as well as sending “a 
small impact shipment of US military equipment for the Congolese army.” If Tshombe did not 
comply a boycott of Katangan copper would be organized. This would include the Belgian 
government; “Belgium import[ed] approximately 75% of Katanga’s copper exports.” If this still 
did not end the secession “US and Belgium and as many other governments as possible w[ould] 
consult with regard to supporting the UN in more stringent measures.”  
The proposal was announced to the UN Security Council by U Thant and was 
subsequently known as the “Thant Plan.” Adoula agreed to the settlement but Tshombe remained 
ambiguous and elusive. The writing was on the wall when the latter’s mercenary army began to 
expand and acquire more weaponry. Tensions continued to rise as Tshombe’s forces began to 
harass UN personnel. By December 1962, it was clear that a showdown was inevitable.    
 The last UN offensive, Operation Grand Slam, began on December 28. Thant’s forces 
were able to capture Elisabethville and quickly moved to occupy Southern Katanga. The mining 
regions of Jadotville and Kolwezi were the prime objectives. On January 3, UN forces began to 
enter Jadotville, where they were met by local inhabitants rather than Katanga troops. The 
Shinkolobwe mine was occupied on January 13. “The number of mercenary officers in the 
Katangan gendarmerie had dwindled” as the UN forces advanced on Kolwezi.
144
 The secession 
officially ended on January 17, 1963, over two years after it began. United Nations forces stayed 
in the Congo until 1964, providing military and administrative assistance. Politically, the 
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Kennedy administration set up a “moderate government with Adoula at head…[but] maintained 
in power by Mobutu.”
145
 
 Congolese stability rested on two pillars, the UN and Mobutu’s troops. Individuals loyal 
to Lumumba, or Lumumbists, were purged from the government and many were forced into 
exile. In 1963, they began to organize in neighboring Brazzaville and founded the Comité 
National de Libération (CNL). The organization started guerrilla activities in the Congo in 1964, 
just as the UN was beginning to withdraw its troops. The city of Stanleyville in Orientale 
Province was occupied in August of 1964 and a “People’s Republic” was declared. A second 
rebellion broke out in the Western section of the Congo and was led by Lumumba’s former 
minister for education, Pierre Mulele. It has been “frequently claimed that communist subversion 
was behind the rebellions. This explanation is doubtful. The Chinese provided some aid, 
particularly to the Mulele organization, but only in miniscule quantities.”
146
 Even though the 
USSR maintained contact with the rebel leaders, their involvement was not substantial. Support 
did come from Cuba in 1965, with the famed guerilla leader Ernesto (Che) Guevara training 
Congolese rebels for several months.  
 The CNL, or Simbas as they became popularly known, in Orientale Province had more 
military success than did Mulele. The Congolese army did not want to fight and quickly 
collapsed because they believed the rebels were using witchcraft. The United States, now under 
the Lyndon Johnson administration, needed to find a solution since their strong man, Mobutu, 
was unable to restore order. Inexplicably, they turned to Moise Tshombe, who became Prime 
Minister in July 1964, four days before the last UN troops left the country. The hope was 
Tshombe’s mercenary army would succeed where the Congolese national army had failed.     
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 Despite American efforts, the Belgian business interests that were only put in check less 
than two years prior were now running the country. Despite Tshombe’s personal charisma and an 
increase in military aid from the Western powers, the rebellions could not be stymied. 
“Washington [now] turned to Europe. U.S. officials pressed the Belgian government “to send in 
their paratroops to reinstitute stability. When they refused a second option had to be 
formulated.
147
 The United States tried to petition other countries to send in troops but to no avail. 
Eventually, the Johnson administration decided to hire more mercenaries. Most came from South 
Africa and Rhodesia.
148
 By October 1964, the NSC estimated that there were over a thousand 
mercenaries in the Congo with the US keeping close watch over them through the CIA and 
military attaches. Cuban refugees were also brought in by the United States to fly American 
aircraft.  
 The ground offensive began on November 1, 1964, with the prime objective being 
Stanleyville. American-sponsored forces encountered little resistance as the rebels ran in fear of 
their modern weaponry. On November 17, the mercenaries began their advance on the rebel held 
city and were able to take most of it in less than a week. Intelligence started to surface, however, 
that the retreating rebels were executing European hostages in retaliation. The confirmation of 
these reports led to the implementation of the so called Dragon Operations, the most famous of 
which was Operation Dragon Rouge in Stanleyville. Belgian paratroops were dropped into the 
city from US planes and overwhelmed the rebels. “Operations Dragon Blanc, Dragon Noir, and 
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Dragon Vert were all airborne operations aimed at rescuing and evacuating hostages in [the cities 
of] Bunia, Paulis and Watsa respectively.”
149
  
 The Belgian and American operations galvanized the international community. Though 
reluctant at first, the Soviet Union started to send weapons to the Simbas. Even though the rebels 
began to be receive military aid from the Eastern bloc, it made little difference since the “Simbas 
did not know how to use them.”
150
 Che Guevara entered the Congo through Tanzania with a 
hundred men in late 1964.
151
 His hope was to start a popular uprising by organizing the 
peasantry. He would preach the wrongdoings of Yankee imperialism, which would foster a 
revolutionary sense in the people. If the Congo could become a second Vietnam, maybe the 
United States could be defeated.  
 The Cuban mission was not a success. Guevara’s men were never able to integrate 
themselves amongst the peasantry as they had hoped but remained isolated because they did not 
speak any of the Congolese languages. Their diet was also poor and they were plagued by illness. 
They withdrew from the conflict after seven months. Guevara believed his failure was due to the 
fact that he tried to incite the Congolese peasantry rather than a labor class. He could not attack 
capitalistic exploitations because land was abundant and the farmers were relatively self-
sufficient. Capitalism had not yet reached the Congolese peasantry let alone exploited them.
152
 
The Simbas would continue to harass the European population of the Congo but they were never 
able to gain as much power as they had in 1964. Pierre Mulele would also be a thorn in the side 
of the Western powers until his execution in 1968.  
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 When the rebellion broke out in 1964, the United States turned to the Belgians to impose 
stability. When the latter refused a solution needed to be found. The first move was to place 
Moise Tshombe back in power as prime minster and hope his mercenary forces could quell the 
Simbas. When this did not come to fruition the United States and Belgium began to recruit 
mostly South African and Rhodesian mercenaries. Once the rebellion was finished Tshombe 
became expendable. On October 13, 1965, the Congolese parliament convened and to “the 
surprise of most, President Kasavubu declared that the transitional tasks of the Tshombe 
government had been completed, and named a leading figure of the anti-Tshombe bloc, Evariste 
Kimba, to form a government in place of Tshombe.”
153
 “The cause of the change in government 
is not clear. However, internal factors, once again, do not account for the change.”
154
 After a 
little more than month of political wrangling between the parliamentary factions, the CIA staged 
a coup on November 25, placing Mobutu back in power.  
 In 1965, Mobutu’s coup was widely approved by the Congolese, who had lost faith in 
their civilian government and wanted to put an end to the instability that had characterized their 
country since its independence.
155
 The political scientists Crawford Young and Thomas E. 
Turner characterized the beginning of Mobutu’s regime in these terms: “The early Mobutu years 
appeared to reflect a progressive implementation of the leviathan state project. The centralized 
authority of the state was reasserted. Its hegemonical thrust eclipsed not only institutional 
authority at lower echelons of the state apparatus, but also claimed tutelary control over all 
spheres of corporate interest.”
156
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A single-party rule was established in 1967, when Mouvement Populaire de la 
Revolution (MRP) was founded by Mobutu. All other political organizations were disbanded and 
prohibited. The central government incorporated civil institutions when it brought trade unions, 
youth groups, and women’s organizations under the MRP’s influence.
157
 Mobutu’s controlled 
press praised him and a cult of personality began to be developed. In 1971, the Congolese 
leader’s efforts to build a single nation state culminated in his renaming the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko.      
With Mobutu firmly in power, the Congo officially passed from the Belgian sphere of 
influence to the American. As indicated earlier, there is a possibility Larry Devlin, the man who 
would become the CIA station chief in the Congo, met Mobutu in 1959 when the two were in 
Belgium. The CIA had participated in both of Mobutu’s coups and used him to funnel money to 
the Congolese army in order to retain its loyalty. Furthermore, once stability was reinstituted in 
the Congo American business interests began to replace Belgian. The industries that attracted the 
most foreign investment were turn-key factory projects, commercial bank loans, hydroelectric 
power, and mineral/oil development.
158
 U.S interests were particularly prevalent; for example, by 




The copper industry was also affected. When new lucrative copper seams were 
discovered in the late 1960s in Katanga, Mobutu gave the concession to a U.S led international 
consortium organized by Maurice Templesman rather than the Belgian Union Minière Haut du 
Katanga. Templesman’s new organization was charted Société Minière de Tenke Fungurume. 
The loss of its copper monopoly was a severe psychological blow to Belgian commercial 
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interests inside the Congo. Belgian dominance of the Congo had come to an end. A 1969 State 
Department policy assessment paper summed up the situation succinctly: “President Mobutu is 
closely identified with us and we with him. An important key to his unquestionable strength lies 







 The focus of the Cold War is generally the competition between the USSR and the 
United States. As David Painter points out though, “almost all of the major violence of the Cold 
War era took place in the Third World.”
161
 This would bring the United States into conflict with 
their NATO allies rather than the Soviet Union. In the Congo during the 1960s, it was primarily 
the Belgians and Americans who were vying for Congolese allegiance rather and an East-West 
struggle. Eventually, the U.S committed itself to the military dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu in 
order to maintain stability in a country plagued by international dissension.  
 The United States’ ability to replace Belgium as the purveyor of stability in the Congo is 
how unipolarity was able to develop. During the nineteenth century, multinational empires were 
created. The Belgian monarch, King Leopold II, gained control over the Congo basin in the 
1870s. After World War II, these empires began to collapse as burgeoning nationalist 
movements threatened colonial rule. 
 In the Near East, the United States’ greatest concern was alleviating the Great Power 
competition between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. Rather than become the sole 
authority in the region, U.S policy makers wanted to prevent developments “from taking place in 
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that area which might make a mockery of the principles on which the United Nations 
Organization rests, which might lead to the impairment, if not the wrecking, of that organization, 
and which might eventually give birth to a third World War.”
162
 The United States espoused 
multilateralist principles in order to maintain peace and end Great Power competition.
163
  
 In the Far East, “during the past four hundred years Western Powers – and more recently 
Japan - by war, threat of war, and exploitation of ignorance on the part of Oriental Governments, 
extended Western sovereignty, economic and political control, or exceptional semi-sovereign 
rights over great areas of Asia and the Pacific.”
164
 Prior to World War II, nationalist leaders 
began to challenge the status quo. Japanese propaganda during the war intensified Asian 
nationalism and contributed to the collapse of old-style oriental colonialism.  
 The United States’ primary objectives were “peace and security, and economic 
welfare.”
165
 While U.S policy makers understood their country’s tradition of upholding self-
determination, “the largest possible measure of political freedom for the countries of Asia 
consistent with their ability to assume the responsibility thereof is probably necessary in order to 
achieve the chief objective of the United States in the Far East and the Pacific: continuing peace 
and security.” The United States was willing to let the colonial powers preserve their position in 
the Far East so stability could be maintained. 
 The United States’ African policy mirrored what it had concluded in the Far East. While 
self-determination was the ultimate goal, for stability to be preserved the European powers 
would have to remain and keep their spheres of influence. In the Congo, as well as in many other 
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countries, this option became impossible as nationalistic forces began to galvanize the 
population. Though the Congolese were granted their independence, Belgium tried to preserve its 
position in the mineral rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai by supporting two secessions. 
The Eisenhower administration nominally supported the Belgians because they did not want the 
USSR to control resource of the two provinces. The United States was not concerned about 
African self-determination when a conflict with the Soviet Union was a possibility. Rather than 
act unilaterally though, the U.S turned to the United Nations.     
 As the struggle persisted, the Soviet threat on the ground was revealed to be minimal. 
However, the Belgians were exposed in actuality as the destabilizing factor. This indeed 
permitted the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc began declaim that old-style colonialism 
was being upheld in the Congo by the United States, United Nations, and Belgium. For the U.S, 
currently in a global struggle for Third World allegiance against the USSR, being charged with 
supporting a former colonial power was detrimental to its position in the international arena. As a 
result, by the time John F. Kennedy became president the United States was pressuring the 
Belgians to withdraw from the Congo.  
 For the majority of the crisis, the USSR condemned the United States publicly while 
privately American policymakers tried to pressure their NATO ally. This aspect of the Cold War, 
intra-NATO conflict, should garner more research and become the focal point in the next 
generation of Cold War scholarship. Understanding the relationship between the United States, 
former colonial metropoles, burgeoning nationalist movements, and the international community 
is integral when trying to explain the unipolar world we live in today.   
 The United States, along with the United Nations, ultimately forced the Belgians out of 
the Congo. In 1965, the CIA backed a coup by Joseph Desire Mobutu, who they had been using 
59 
 
to funnel money to the Congolese army in order to retain its allegiance. With Mobutu in power, 
the Congo shifted from being aligned with Belgium to the U.S. This is how unipolarity was able 
to develop. The United States replaced former colonial metropoles as purveyors of stability. 
America, as a superpower with global concerns, positioned itself in opposition to their NATO 
allies when the latter threatened the U.S’s position in the international arena. The Truman 
administration’s pressure on the Netherlands to give up the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), 
Eisenhower’s anger towards Britain and France during the Suez Crisis, in addition to the 
Belgian-American conflict in the Congo were all intra-NATO disputes over questions of neo-
colonialism. In all three cases, residual hegemony of the colonial metropoles was superseded by 
US-indigenous alignment. To truly understand how unipolarity was able to come about, scholars 
must see the Cold War as a continuation of nineteenth century great power politics, while 
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